



Pashov Audit Group

BOB Token Security Review

October 18th 2025 - October 21st 2025



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1. About Pashov Audit Group

Pashov Audit Group consists of 40+ freelance security researchers, who are well proven in the space - most have earned over \$100k in public contest rewards, are multi-time champions or have truly excelled in audits with us. We only work with proven and motivated talent.

With over 300 security audits completed — uncovering and helping patch thousands of vulnerabilities — the group strives to create the absolute very best audit journey possible. While 100% security is never possible to guarantee, we do guarantee you our team's best efforts for your project.

Check out our previous work [here](#) or reach out on Twitter [@pashovkrum](#).

2. Disclaimer

A smart contract security review can never verify the complete absence of vulnerabilities. This is a time, resource and expertise bound effort where we try to find as many vulnerabilities as possible. We can not guarantee 100% security after the review or even if the review will find any problems with your smart contracts. Subsequent security reviews, bug bounty programs and on-chain monitoring are strongly recommended.

3. Risk Classification

Severity	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: High	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: Medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: Low	Medium	Low	Low

Impact

- **High** - leads to a significant material loss of assets in the protocol or significantly harms a group of users
- **Medium** - leads to a moderate material loss of assets in the protocol or moderately harms a group of users
- **Low** - leads to a minor material loss of assets in the protocol or harms a small group of users

Likelihood

- **High** - attack path is possible with reasonable assumptions that mimic on-chain conditions, and the cost of the attack is relatively low compared to the amount of funds that can be stolen or lost
- **Medium** - only a conditionally incentivized attack vector, but still relatively likely
- **Low** - has too many or too unlikely assumptions or requires a significant stake by the attacker with little or no incentive



4. About BOB Token

BOB Token is an upgradeable ERC20 governance token with voting capabilities.

5. Executive Summary

A time-boxed security review of the `bob-collective/bob-token` repository was done by Pashov Audit Group, during which `zark`, `Tejas Warambhe`, `IvanFitro`, `afriauditor` engaged to review **BOB Token**. A total of **2** issues were uncovered.

Protocol Summary

Project Name	BOB Token
Protocol Type	ERC20 Token
Timeline	October 18th 2025 - October 21st 2025

Review commit hash:

- [ba519a023c9d0239b48f887b185fbedc9b7b6139](#)
(bob-collective/bob-token)

Scope

`BobTokenV2.sol`

`BobTokenV2Upgrade.sol`



6. Findings

Findings count

Severity	Amount
Low	2
Total findings	2

Summary of findings

ID	Title	Severity	Status
[L-01]	<code>ERC20BurnableUpgradeable</code> and others not initialized in <code>BobToken</code>	Low	Acknowledged
[L-02]	<code>setCCIPAdmin</code> uses <code>DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE</code> not <code>onlyOwner</code> as stated	Low	Acknowledged



Low findings

[L-01] ERC20BurnableUpgradeable and others not initialized in BobToken

BobToken inherits from ERC20BurnableUpgradeable, AccessControlUpgradeable, and NoncesUpgradeable but they are not initialized. It is considered best practice to initialize these parent contracts.

Recommendation: Initialize ERC20BurnableUpgradeable, AccessControlUpgradeable, and NoncesUpgradeable.

[L-02] setCCIPAdmin uses DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE not onlyOwner as stated

Docs say “only the owner can call this function”, but the code enforces:

```
function setCCIPAdmin(address newAdmin) public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {  
    ...  
}
```

After ownership is transferred (via OwnableUpgradeable), the new owner may not have DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. Since roles aren't auto-synced on ownership changes, the old default admin (initial owner) can still call setCCIPAdmin, while the new owner cannot.

Recommendations

- Change modifier to onlyOwner.

```
function setCCIPAdmin(address newAdmin) public onlyOwner {  
    address currentAdmin = s_ccipAdmin;  
    s_ccipAdmin = newAdmin;  
    emit CCIPAdminTransferred(currentAdmin, newAdmin);  
}
```